Executive discretion over policy outcomes is an inevitable feature of our political system. However, in recent years, the President has sought to expand his discretion through a variety of controversial and legally questionable tactics. Through a series of simple separation of powers models, we study one such tactic, employed by both Democratic and Republican presidents: the use of signing statements, which purport to have status in the interpretation of statutory meaning. Our models also show that signing statements upset the constitutional vision of lawmaking and, in a wide range of cases, exacerbate legislative gridlock. We argue that courts should not legally credit signing statements; we conclude by discussing executive opportunism broadly. 
Introduction
According to many observers, our constitutional system is run through with executive opportunism. 1 The tools of opportunism defy a census, but include at least executive agreements with foreign entities, executive orders unsupported by or contrary to statutes, informal guidance documents that escape the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and its safeguards, regulations that exceed or at least strain statutory authority, systematic non-enforcement of statutory provisions, and presidential signing statements. Moreover, the policy areas affected by such tools ever-more appear to represent some of the most important choices faced by our democracy: for example, how to confront the problem of climate change, or how to reform our immigration policies. Here and elsewhere the Executive branch behaves opportunistically, upsetting settled expectations about the admittedly hazy constitutional boundaries of its legitimate authority.
Our objective in this article is to offer a positive analysis of executive opportunism that accounts for the behavior not only of the Executive himself, but also of other institutional actors.
To focus the analysis, we examine executive opportunism through the window of one important tool, presidential signing statements, with the hope of thereby generating insights about the more general phenomenon. Signing statements represent a particularly attractive tool of opportunism to study because of their historical prominence-with presidents of both parties using them widely-and because they fit into the otherwise familiar setting of statutory interpretation, 1 See, e.g., the submissions for the Hoover Institution conference entitled "The Role of Executive Power and Discretion under the Rule of Law." For another recent entry in this area, see Freeman and Spence (2014) , which examines agencies' adaptations of old statutes to confront newly arising problems. emphasizing the important role that courts might play in helping to define the contours of permissible executive authority.
Presidential signing statements enable the president to express his views about legislation, to explain why he is signing the law and to state his view on the constitutionality of the law. More controversially, these statements can, and not infrequently do, declare what he will or will not enforce or implement in this new legislation. Or they describe how, in the president's view, the courts or agencies should interpret the law. This latter tactic understandably riles many commentators, insofar as it reflects post-legislative executive opportunism and arguably threatens the Constitution's separation of powers. Through these types of signing statements, those in which the president declares in a statement that he will construe the relevant statute to accord with his interpretation, the president is selectively invalidating parts of laws passed by both chambers of Congress.
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The normative objections to presidential signing statements are substantial and complex. To address the question of how signing statements affect the legislative process we adopt varying assumptions regarding the legal authority of signing statements. We begin this analysis 5 with a standard model of the legislative process.
3 Although the existing literature has recognized that signing statements potentially have a direct effect on statutes (e.g., Rodriguez 1992, Bradley and Posner 2006) , arguably effectively invalidating legislative provisions passed by Congress, the literature has failed to anticipate the subtler and more important indirect effects we focus on.
Our main theoretical results show the following: Because signing statements, if given legal effect by courts, 4 change the meaning of an act, rational legislators will take them into account in the legislative process. Building on this basic premise, our models show that, in a wide range of cases, Congress prefers the status quo -that is, no legislation -to legislation followed by a presidential signing statement. Moreover, as we show, signing statements result in 3 Application of positive political theory to understanding the legislative process, particularly interacting with courts, include: Cohen and Spitzer (1992), Eskridge and Ferejohn (1992, 2000) , Ferejohn and Weingast (1992) , Marks (1988 Consolidated Rail Corp., 785 F. Supp. 1309 (N.D. Ill. 1992 . Thus far, courts have adopted a variety of positions on the appropriate uses of presidential signing statements as a tool of statutory interpretation. We examine different assumptions about the legal status of signing statements, and in this way address the question of whether courts should give legal meaning to the statements. a startling constitutional "role reversal", with the legislature issuing vetoes, and the president in substantial measure determining the content of the laws. Our most basic results indicate that presidential signing statements have a potentially pernicious effect on the constitutionally specified process of legislation specified in Article I, Section 7.
We also consider cases where legislation delegates authority to an administrative agency, examining several assumptions about bureaucratic motivations. We show that delegating to a bureaucracy reduces some of the dysfunctions associated with traditional lawmaking. However, signing statements often re-aggravate the lawmaking process, diminishing the moderating benefits of bureaucratic delegation, and increasing legislative gridlock. Scholars generally divide signing statements into several categories based on what they purport to accomplish and the legal authority they rely on (Dellinger 1993 , Kelley 2003 , Bradley and Posner 2006 . We follow a more or less common set of distinctions between what might be termed constitutional statements, interpretive statements, and celebratory statements. In the first category of statements, the president declares that, under his view of the constitution, some statutory provision is unconstitutional, or would be unconstitutional in some circumstances, or will be interpreted in a fashion to avoid some threatening constitutional infirmity (Dellinger 1993 ). In the second category, the president uses the statement to interpret some statutory provision, arguably inserting his views into the meaning of the statute (Dellinger 1993 Consistent with this historical narrative, data supports the proposition that the Reagan administration represented a turning point in executive practices with respect to signing statements. In figure 1 , we plot the two panels: on the left, the number of public laws for which the president includes a signing statement interpreting provisions over time; on the right, the proportion of public laws that have such a signing statement. 8 Each dot in this figure represents the number (left panel) or proportion (right panel) of public laws with interpretive signing statements attached to them in a given year; the dashed line shows the locally weighted average for these quantities (Cleveland 1979) . As is evident from this figure, presidents issued relatively few substantive signing statements until the early 1980s. At that point, presidents dramatically increased their use of signing statements, a pattern that persists in the main through both Democratic and Republican administrations. The number of signing statements then declined markedly post 2006, when a vigorous public debate erupted regarding the propriety of the 7 Pub. L. 99-339.statements. We now live in an era with a nearly pre-Reagan incidence of signing statements, but the debate over the propriety of statements continues as many issues remain unresolved and presidents in the future may re-invigorate the tool, as such tools enhance presidential influence over the policymaking process.
Before turning squarely the analysis of signing statements over the modern time period, we pause to clarify the context in which presidents issue signing statements. One potentially misleading observation in the commentary on such statements derives from the fact that, to a large extent, the recent public debate over signing statements arose in the context of a larger debate about executive power and the war on terrorism. The tacit assumption here is that the vast majority of signing statements deal with matters of foreign policy and the executive's role as commander in chief. This is not accurate. Not all, or even most, of presidential signing statements concern foreign policy. Indeed, in what we believe to be the most complete analysis of the topics covered by signing statements, we find that only about one-quarter of signing statements attach to public laws concerning foreign policy. 9 It is true that the president is far more likely to issue a signing statement for a bill contending with foreign policy than domestic policy: he writes a signing statement for roughly 4.5 percent of foreign policy bills, compared to roughly 2.5 percent of domestic policy bills. However, the president issues signing statements for some areas of domestic policy, such as environmental policy, with a much greater likelihood than for foreign policy. We observe considerable heterogeneity within domestic policy. To demonstrate this point, in the left panel of figure 2 , we present the number of interpretive signing statements issued by presidents between 1950 and 2011, broken down by the topic of the bill in question; the right panel shows the proportion of bills in each policy area with a signing statement. Most significantly, this simple figure reveals that presidents issue interpretive signing statements on a wide range of policy issues; in fact, conditional on being presented a bill, he is most likely to issue statements on contentious domestic issues: civil rights and the environment. Thus, though foreign policy represents an important area of policy for signing statements, the vast majority of statements in fact attach to public laws concerning domestic policies, and the public laws most likely to receive a signing statement fall in the domestic arena.
A second important contextual point is that a president is far more likely to write a signing statement for an important law than a trivial one. The Congressional Quarterly Almanac contains a list of "key votes" in each Congress, reflecting CQ's assessment of the votes in a
given Congress that represent "a matter of great controversy," "a test of presidential or political power," or a "decision of potentially great impact on the nation and lives of Americans." 10 We examine the lists of key votes and determine whether each public law in our database is associated with such a vote. 11 This exercise indicates that signing statements condition heavily on the importance of the public law. Overall, our data indicate that presidents write statements for about 3 percent of all public laws. By comparison, 21 percent of key public laws have signing 13 statements.
12 Thus, it is the most important public laws-not the trivial ones-that tend to attract the president's attention in signing statements.
An Analysis of Signing Statements

3.a. Preliminaries
The objective of our analysis is to describe in the simplest possible form the strategic interaction among several branches of government and to chart the implications of possible judicial practices with respect to signing statements. We describe analytically the consequences of what signing statements might be, if taken seriously by courts. This, as we suggest in our introduction, ought to inform anyone's normative views about the desirability of giving legal effect to signing statements. 13 Our first two models include only the president and the Congress; our second two models additionally include a bureaucracy.
When we analyze the potential effects of signing statements, we assume that they have the force of law; that is, that these statements are not just advisory statements akin to a memo from the White House to agencies. Notice that this position conflicts with Bradley and Posner (2007) , who write that "the President … can uncontroversially announce [his] views about the constitutionality of a statute in other contexts," such as an internal memo, and that the statement does little more than enhance the transparency of the President's constitutional views. This perspective suggests a generous perspective on Presidential behavior: he is motivated by a desire to increase the transparency of the political process. We adopt the more conventional assumption that the President is primarily motivated by policy objectives (see, e.g., Krehbiel 1998 , Howell 2013 ). In our view, he issues statements precisely because they might have colorable legal force and confer policy benefits that cannot be achieved through internal memos or campaign speeches.
3.b. Model 1A: Original Legislation
We study the Article I, Section 7 legislative process in the context of a president and
Congress that have diverging views over the most appropriate public policy, . In the simple family of models we consider, the policy choice is binary: the policymaking organs of government can set or . This choice might reflect, for example, a decision to increase or decrease pollution control requirements. 14 Against this policy choice, actors weight the benefits provided to them by the status quo policy, , which is defined over the interval .
14 Note that this is a common simplifying assumption in the modeling literature. See, for example, Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001), Maskin and Tirole (2004) , Fox and Jordan (2011) .
and , where we use "E" to subscript payoffs for the president, and "C" to subscript payoffs for the Congress. Thus, the executive prefers to set and the Congress prefers to set . By comparison, in the absence of a policy, both the president and the Congress receive a payoff of . Notice that because is defined over negative values, Congress and the president often face an incentive to cooperate on public policy.
The structure of policymaking follows the contours of Article I, Section 7. First, we begin with a randomly chosen status quo; in technical terms, nature selects a status quo, , from the distribution F defined over [-1,1] . Second, the Congress chooses between legislation in which it sets , or the status quo, q. If the latter, then the interaction ends, and all receive their payoffs.
Third, if the Congress legislates, the president decides whether to veto the legislation, after which the game ends. 15 If he vetoes the legislation, the status quo remains intact; otherwise the congressional policy goes into effect.
This interaction produces a simple equilibrium outcome, which we find by working backwards from the final move. 16 At this stage, the president clearly vetoes any legislation that makes him worse off. In technical terms, E vetoes the legislation-assuming there is legislation-if and only if the benefits or "utility" of the status quo outweigh the benefits of the policy, . This means that when the president will not veto the policy, regardless of whether , as he prefers, or , as Congress prefers; when < 0 the president does better with either policy than with the status quo. Because the president prefers p 15 Without great loss, we ignore the constitutional wrinkle raised by veto overrides. 16 The solution concept is subgame perfection.
€ p = 0 = 1 to all other policies, this veto strategy also means that the president never vetoes the policy when .
Working back a stage in calculating the equilibrium, we note that Congress anticipates the veto behavior of the president. Seeing that the president does not veto legislation when the Congress sets when the status quo is in that part of the interval. By contrast, when either Congress or the president prefers the status quo to the policy payoffs of legislation.
That is, under the status quo, both constitutional actors receive a positive payoff, whereas under legislation one or the other actor receives a payoff of zero: if Congress sets , the president receives a payoff of zero and therefore vetoes the legislation; were Congress to set ,
Congress receives a payoff of zero, so it will not do so. Thus, the equilibrium policy outcome in this interaction is straightforward: if the policy outcome is , which improves the welfare of both the president and the Congress relative to the status quo; if the president and Congress cannot agree on a policy, and the status quo remains.
Although simple, this model reflects our constitutional structure and demonstrates results common to separation of powers models in the positive political theory literature (e.g., Volden 1998, 2005; Krehbiel 1998; Clark 2009 ). First, when the status quo policy is highly unpleasant to both constitutional actors, these actors have an incentive to cooperate even in the face of profound disagreements over policy. Second, because Congress is the first mover and the president possesses only veto and not amendment powers, policy outcomes tend to favor congressional preferences. Notice that when there is legislation, it reflects Congress's preferred policy (Romer and Rosenthal 1978) . Third, over a wide range status quos, Congress and the president cannot agree on how to improve policy, and the status quo remains intact
3.c. Model 1B: Legislation with Signing Statements
Under the standard view, the president uses signing statements to "reinterpret the language of the bill so as to coincide with his own views" (Graber and Wimmer 1987, 366) . We model signing statements in a manner that reflects this assumption. In this model, we allow the president to "reinterpret" the statute. Specifically, in the model we allow E to reset after
Congress has chosen to produce legislation. That is, this case replicates model 1A, which describes the originalist notion of legislation, except we permit the president to change the value of in the legislation, in addition to vetoing the legislation.
This revised interaction featuring signing statements also produces a simple equilibrium policy outcome. Again proceeding by backwards induction, if there is legislation the president faces no incentive to veto; he is always better off with than with any value of . As a result, the president sets through a signing statement any time that Congress produces legislation. Congress anticipates this behavior by the president and knows that, if it passes legislation, its payoff will be . This means that the Congress is better off with the status quo any time that , and is better off with a statute, as re-interpreted by the president, any time that .
Thus, as with originalist legislation, policy disagreement between the constitutional actors produces zones of cooperation as well as a zone of "gridlock." In our simple family of models, these two zones in fact coincide in the two models: regardless of signing statements, the
€ q < 0 president and the Congress cannot agree on policy when and no legislation is produced.
However, signing statements produce a form of constitutional "role reversal": with signing statements, Congress is relegated to veto-issuing role (albeit ex ante rather than ex post); the Executive determines the ultimate character of the policy. Treating signing statements with the force of law allows the president to assert a dramatic power over Congress.
3.d. Model 2A: Original Legislation with Bureaucracy
We now consider the effect of signing statements in the case where Congress and the president have decided to delegate the policy choice to an administrative agency. For nearly a century, administrative agencies have implemented the vast majority of legislative acts (Eskridge and Ferejohn 1992) . Indeed, one view is that the president is principally speaking to administrative agencies when issuing signing statements. The question therefore is how bureaucratic implementation influences the effect of signing statements.
Scholars employ a range of assumptions about the preferences of the bureaucracy and its role in producing public policy. Some scholars argue that ex ante procedures combine with ex post incentives to make bureaucrats faithful to the enacting president and Congress. Favoring presidential control, one might point to appointments, (generally) removal, (generally) OIRA € q > 0 review, 17 as well as more informal methods of influence, such as public statements in support of or in opposition to regulatory positions (see generally Eskridge and Ferejohn 1992, Kagan 2001) . 18 Favoring congressional control, one might point to Congress's primacy in budgeting its control over the structure of agencies and the procedures they employ (McNollgast 1987), more generally its ability to write specific and constraining statutes, its ability to hold oversight hearings (Aberbach2001). Finally, other scholars emphasize the power of both constitutional actors, with the resulting power creating a bargaining game between them. For example, the president may have the power of appointment, but the Senate's must confirm the president's most important appointees (Synder and Weingast 2000, McCarty 2004 ). Indeed, most empirical studies of the bureaucracy suggest that agencies respond to both political principals and that neither completely controls (e.g., Bertelli and Grose 2011). We acknowledge these heterogeneous approaches; for the purposes of this paper, we remain agnostic about bureaucratic preferences, representing them as a parameter in our model.
To model a bureaucracy under plural control, we consider a simple stochastic bureaucracy, in which the administrative agency effectively flips a (possibly weighted) coin over the policy alternatives. We do not mean to suggest that this is literally how agencies select policies, and such a method of policy making would certainly run afoul of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), if not the Constitution. However, from the perspective of Congress and President, it may be difficult to determine the bureaucracy's choice ex ante. In fact, the widely varying assumptions that scholars use when modeling the bureaucracy reflect the many, often-contradictory forces that influence bureaucratic behavior. Given this background, at the time Congress passes a bill or the president signs it, the political principals will often not have perfect information about how agencies will implement the statute. In this sense, from the ex ante perspective of Congress or the president, bureaucratic behavior may appear to contain an element of "randomness."
We model this feature of C and E's perspective on bureaucratic implementation by building in a stochastic component to the agency's decision. Let the bureaucracy set with probability and with probability . The larger is the more likely the bureaucracy sides with the president, and the smaller is the more likely it sides with the Congress. Thus, can be viewed as a parameter reflecting the relative control that the president and Congress exert over the agency, with larger values indicating greater presidential control.
We append the bureaucracy to the Article I, Section 7 structure described above; the new sequence of the interaction is as follows. First, nature selects a status quo, . Second, the Congress decides whether to legislate or not. If not, the status quo remains intact, the interaction ends, and all players receive their payoffs. Third, if the Congress legislates, the president decides whether to veto the legislation. If he vetoes, the status quo remains intact, the interaction ends, and all players receive payoffs. If he does not veto the legislation, fourth, the bureaucracy sets with probability and with probability . Notice that the bureaucracy is not a strategic actor in our model; to the extent it has preferences, they should be understood as induced by tools of presidential and congressional control, reflected in the value of .
Working backwards, we note that president vetoes the legislation when the expected payoff from the policy is less than the payoff from the status quo. Put another way, the president
€ β 21 will sign the legislation when it makes him better off in expectation; the president is better off signing the legislation, on average, when , the probability the agency sets = 1, the president's preferred policy, exceeds q, his payoff from the status quo. Formally, when
the president signs the bill and the agency implements the policy.
Sensibly, the greater the influence he has over the bureaucracy, the more willing is the president to sign a bill delegating authority to the bureaucracy. The Congress, likewise, legislates when the expected payoff from legislating is greater than the payoff from the status quo: that is, in the context of the payoffs described above, when the probability the bureaucracy sides with the Congress, is greater than the payoff from the status quo, or in other words, when
Also sensibly, the Congress is more willing to legislate when it exerts more control over the bureaucracy.
An important result from this interaction is that, subject to various political conditions relating to q and β, the bureaucracy inspires cooperation among the constitutional actors. These two variables are the principal parameters of the model that help explain how political conditions affect policy choice by C and E. We can neatly explain policy choice as a function of these parameters. Figure 3 plots the policy outcome as a function of q and β. To see the relationship of policy choice to the parameters, observe that when q< 0, both C and E prefer C's ideal policy of 0 to q (the president receives a payoff of zero in this context). Hence, both constitutional actors will support legislation moving policy from q to 0. As this is true for any value of the status quo, q, greater than -1 and less than 0, we darken the region 1 in the figure in the same way, indicating that the same equilibrium occurs, although the specific values of q and β may differ. Importantly, as the bureaucracy becomes more "politicized" (e.g., Lewis 2003) , the value of the administrative state as a commitment device diminishes. This can be seen by noting that both the president and Congress cooperate on legislation only when € q < β < 1 − q, which is difficult to satisfy when € β is large or small. The inequality is most easily satisfied, in the sense that it encompasses the largest possible interval of status quos, when
, so that the bureaucracy is balanced between Congress and the president; that is, it is equally likely that the bureaucracy will favor the president or the Congress.
3.e. Model 2B: Legislation with Bureaucracy and Signing Statements
In the context of the bureaucracy, we model signing statements by allowing them to influence the probability that the agency selects a policy consistent with the president's views. If the president issues a signing statement, the probability that the agency sets
where € s ∈[0,1 − β]. We take s to be an exogenous parameter reflecting the incremental influence that a signing statement gives the president in the bureaucratic implementation of the statute. The value of € s might reflect, for instance, the weight that courts give to signing statements, a topic we discuss below. The sequence of the interaction is identical to that in model 2A, but now, in addition to vetoing the legislation, the president may approve it with a signing statement.
A preliminary observation is that the president faces no incentive to withhold a signing statement if he signs the bill, as doing so increases the probability the policy aligns with his views, and this advantage comes at no cost to him. With this in mind, and building off the discussion above, it is apparent that we end up with an equilibrium of the following nature: the president signs the bill, with a statement, when
When signing statements grant the president more control over the bureaucracy, or when his signing statements carry a great deal of weight with the courts, then these statements make it more likely that the president will sign the bill. The Congress, likewise, legislates when the expected payoff from legislating is greater than the payoff from the status quo:
The Congress is more willing to legislate when it exerts more control over the bureaucracy, and when signing statements carry less weight.
Signing statements have a potentially dramatic influence over the behavior of the constitutional actors. Generally, they make the president more willing to sign legislation, if passed by Congress. But they also make Congress less likely to pass legislation. This can either increase or decrease the ability of the constitutional actors to cooperate in making public policy.
To see this, note that signing statements shift (in expectation) the bureaucracy toward the president's preferred position. This means that if
, such that the bureaucracy is already pre-disposed to support the president, the signing statements result in an increasingly "politicized" bureaucracy that reduces the interval of status quo policies over which the Congress and the president might reach agreement. In the context of figure 3, signing statements mean we move up the downward sloping edge joining regions 2 and 4, reflecting a shrinking interval in the status quos greater than zero over which both actors prefer legislating to not. By comparison, , if signing statements do not exert too much influence, such that € s < 1 − 2β, they in fact enlarge the interval of status quos over which the constitutional actors cooperate; by contrast, if € s > 1 − 2β, the signing statement results in a bureaucracy that favors the president (more than it had previously favored the congress), and the signing statement reduces the interval over which inter-branch cooperation is possible.
Several important implications emerge from this variation of the model. First, as above, the presence of the bureaucracy improves the ability of the president and Congress to reach agreements. The bureaucracy, in effect, represents a device that allows the elected officials to tie their hands and to discourage opportunism; it allows the branches to overcome commitment problems that often prevent them from addressing pressing public policy concerns. Second, signing statements often, but not always, serve to diminish the usefulness of the bureaucracy in this respect. Any time that the bureaucracy already favors the president ( ). We return to this point below. Third, notice that when signing statements diminish the ability of the branches to cooperate, the president himself wants to commit to use them, but he cannot help himself from doing so; he uses them despite himself.
We also return to this point below.
The Legal Status of Signing Statements
The sequence of positive models reveals a range of interesting results about the effects of signing statements on legislation. Some of these effects are straightforward, but some are subtle and strategic, and these effects have typically gone unnoticed in the literature. Most obviously, signing statements illustrate our point about executive opportunism. These statements dramatically affect the legislative process. More to the point, they interfere with the constitutional structure of lawmaking, as embodied in Article I, Section 7 of the U.S.
Constitution. By allowing the president to revise legislation after the fact, signing statements allow the president to neutralize the role of Congress with respect to writing the legislation.
Congress retains a veto over legislation -albeit an ex ante rather than an ex post veto -but little more. In anticipation of the dramatic effects of signing statements, Congress will exercise its veto extensively, preventing legislation that allows the president to alter legislation to his ideal policy. This form of legislative "role reversal" is at odds with the plain text of the constitution.
To the extent that constitutional text serves as a normative benchmark, we should disapprove of signing statements.
In studying the role of the bureaucracy, our positive study reveals a novel and nuanced view into legislative dynamics set off by signing statements. As indicated above, the bureaucracy often allows the Congress and president to reach agreements that would not otherwise be possible. Signing statements sometimes help facilitate such cooperation-by making the bureaucracy more moderate-and sometimes impede such cooperation-by making the bureaucracy overly sympathetic to the president. To the extent we wish to facilitate more cooperation between the branches in lawmaking, these points serve as another normative benchmark. For example, we might want to encourage such cooperation because, in the absence of democratic lawmaking, social problems tend to get addressed by other, less democratically accountable branches of government (e.g., Eskridge 2012) . In policy areas where the president generally exerts more control over the bureaucracy than Congress, our correspondingly general normative conclusion is that courts should not credit signing statements as informative pieces of legislative history. Doing so tends only to produce more disagreement between Congress and the president, inducing legislative gridlock and effectively allowing less accountable appendages of the government resolve our social problems.
What is more, the president himself tends to want courts to ignore signing statements-in fact, he does best when signing statements do not matter. But if the courts take signing statements seriously, the president cannot help himself from using them. The courts can therefore serve as a commitment technology for the president by tying his hands and allowing him to commit not to use signing statements, or more accurately to do so ceremonially only.
At the same time, if courts do credit signing statements as informative pieces of legislative history, they should do so with respect to the agencies that most align with the Congress, as doing so results in a less politicized bureaucracy that encourages cooperation between the branches. Most centrally, this means that courts might want to consider crediting signing statements for statutes delegating authority to independent agencies, but to withhold from doing so with respect to executive agencies. Because independent agencies come under weaker presidential control-they largely fall outside the purview of OIRA, and the president obviously has diminished removal powers over their officers-Congress has greater relative control over their behavior, and signing statements may allow the president to generate a more moderate bureaucratic implementation of the statute.
Two related issues follow from this view of signing statements. First, some scholars argue that, even if not part of legislative history, signing statements should be entitled to 28 Chevron deference from the courts (Calabresi and Levi 2006, Bradley and Posner 2006) . 19 This position arguably rests on firmer ground than the position that signing statements should be viewed as part of the legislative history: (i) it takes the statute as a given, not itself affected by the signing statement; and (ii) it then attempts to insert the signing statement into a standard deference regime that typically applies to agencies' post-enactment interpretations of statutes.
Second, a closely related question involves the form of deference courts should give to agency interpretations of statutes when agencies rely, even if only implicitly, on a signing statement.
Consider first the view that Chevron deference should apply to signing statements themselves. The validity of this position depends on both formal and functional considerations.
Formally, the view underlying the Chevron doctrine is that an ambiguity in the statute represents an implicit delegation by Congress to agencies: we infer from the existence an ambiguity in a statute a congressional intent to permit the agency to decide the matter. How reasonable is it to view ambiguities as implicit delegations to the president, rather than to an agency? We view this inference as shaky at best. Congress may delegate to agencies for a number of reasons that do not apply to the president himself: the expertise of the agency, the fact that Congress exerts an important measure of downstream control over the agency, and the fact that the agency must follow congressional specified procedures when interpreting and implementing the statute (McNollgast 1987) . By comparison, the president is a generalist, not an expert, Congress has relatively little influence over his downstream behavior, and plainly there is no APA analog for signing statements. For these reasons, the conventional inference that supports Chevron deference is greatly attenuated with respect to signing statements.
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Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) . Functionally, we also show above that signing statements often work at cross-purposes with delegations generally. Delegations to the bureaucracy help to facilitate inter-branch cooperation, permitting the lawmaking organs to address pressing public policy problems.
Signing statements often-but not always-undermine this role of the bureaucracy. This consideration, too, suggests that signing statements ought not receive Chevron deference as a general rule.
With respect to agency interpretations that themselves derive from signing statements, the matter is complicated by practical, but not by theoretical, considerations. The practical difficulty is that agencies will likely not be forthcoming about whether their interpretation of the statute is rooted in a signing statement. More likely, they will present the interpretation as derived natively. However, if the agency discloses that its interpretation is motivated by the signing statement, then for the reasons above we also regard such interpretations as not generally entitled to Chevron deference.
Conclusions
We have studied signing statements as a window into a broader class of activities in which the executive behaves opportunistically. We make no claim that signing statements are the principal vehicle of executive opportunism. Other presidential efforts, including, especially, those at the level of the administrative agency, are more efficacious (and, for that reason, more worrisome). Nonetheless, signing statements are interesting in that they represent the indefatigable efforts on the part of the executive to craft innovative mechanisms for influence and intervention. It is only by understanding these novel strategies that we can get a fuller picture of the structure of executive-legislative relations and the impact of these relations on our constitutional structure of government.
The heart of this paper is a positive model of the effect of signing statements on the legislative process. (Balkin 2011) . A conspicuous attention to constitutional change and evolution is essential for, at the very least, the positive political reason that, without the ability to adapt to changing circumstances, constitutions are far more likely to fail (on adaptability, see Hayek 1960 , North 2006 , Mittal 2011 , and Mittal and Weingast 2012 .
So, with this perspective, we describe the functions of signing statements under the assumptions that Congress and the president engage in strategic behavior to maximize their influence and impact. Moreover, we take a dynamic view of this pattern of behavior, looking not only at Congress-President competition and policymaking tactics, but also at the ways in which the Constitution's structure of lawmaking in Article I, Section 7 properly regulates this competition.
This study of signing statements suggests several lessons that apply broadly to instances in which the executive behaves opportunistically-upsetting settled views about the boundaries of his permissible authority under the Constitution. The first lesson is that coordinate branches of government are unlikely to ignore executive opportunism on signing statements. Instead, Congress is likely to adapt its own behavior to new field of play established by the president: it is likely to attempt to punish the executive for his opportunism, and it is likely to attempt to design legislative schemes that mitigate the effects of the executive's boundary-altering behavior. Our model, for instance, indicates that opportunism may increase legislative gridlock. But we have also seen the Congress engage in numerous other such activities in recent times: withholding funding of DHS in an attempt to induce the president to withdraw his immigration enforcement guidance, likewise delaying the confirmation of nominations to important executive-branch appointments in retaliation for executive opportunism.
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A second lesson is that, in the face of such actions, it is not at all clear that the president himself-to say nothing of the public-is better off in a world in which he behaves opportunistically. For example, our model indicates that signing statements might, if given legal effect by the courts, result in policy inertia that make the president worse off than if he were not permitted to issue such statements. 21 The problem for the president, of course, is that the president cannot commit in advance that, once Congress moves, he will refrain from behaving opportunistically.
Various means exist that potentially constrain the executive-in his own interest-from behaving opportunistically. For example, repeated interactions between the president and the Congress may allow Congress to develop punishment strategies that effectively diminish opportunistic behavior. The development of such strategies, however, requires, most obviously, repetition. It is not clear how effective such strategies will be for second term presidents; indeed, it is probably not a mistake that most of President Obama's most aggressive uses of executive power have come during his second term. And the president is most likely to defect in policy areas most central to his agenda. A third lesson, therefore, is that the courts may play a critical role in helping to delineate the permissible boundaries for legislative authority; boundaries that make all actors better off, including the president. We focus on the context of signing statements and statutory interpretation, but again, the same insight applies to other contexts, such as the scope of the executive's authority to systematically not enforce statutory provisions. 
